Charlottesville Hotel Guide

This is a very informative article by Haaretz's Amos Harel on the close symbiosis that exists between settler activists-- including those responsible for most of the so-called "illegal" or "unauthorized" settlement outposts-- and high-level authorities inside the IDF and other organs of the Israeli state.

He writes,

The outposts are a continuation of the settlements by other means. The sharp distinction Israel makes between them is artificial. Every outpost is established with a direct connection to a mother settlement, with the clear aim of expanding the takeover of the territory and ensuring an Israeli hold on a wider tract of land. Construction in the outposts is integrated into the overall plan of the settlement project and is carried out in parallel to the seizure of lands within and close to the settlements.

He illustrates the cooperation of state authorities in the establishment and maintenance of the so-called "outposts" in the case of one called Migron:

Migron is surrounded by a fence, guarded and connected to the necessary water and electricity infrastructures. Its "ascent to the land," even though it was done on private Palestinian property, and despite the fact that it was undertaken in a deceptive manner, has received backing and practical support from the state. The security establishment's declaration to the High Court of Justice this week that it would take more than a year to implement the compromise agreement, whereby the inhabitants of Migron would be moved to the adjacent settlement of Adam, shows that this backing is still in place...

Behind every settlement action there is a planning and thinking mind that has access to the state's database and maps, and help from sympathetic officers serving in key positions in the IDF and the Civil Administration. The story is not in the settlers' uncontrolled behavior, though there is evidence of this on some of the hilltops, but rather in conscious choices by the state to enforce very little of the law.
Harel writes that the the Obama administration has held fast to the position that all the 100 "outposts" identified by the United Nations and by Israeli attorney Talia Sasson must be evacuated. (And not just the 23 or 26 outposts that PM Sharon's security adviser Dov Weisglas agreed to evacuate, back in 2001.)

He writes that most of the present outposts were established during two waves of activity: between 1997 and 1999 (when, of course, Netanyahu was the PM), and between 2001 and 2003 (i.e., under Sharon-- and notwithstanding Wesiglas's 2001 promise to evacuate some of the ones that were already there.)

He adds,

During those years, the area of the settlements themselves increased. The symbiosis between the army and the settlers in the West Bank was at its peak then. Many of the terror attacks elicited "a suitable Zionist response" with the army's encouragement: the establishment of a new outpost or the pushing back of the fence around an existing settlement.

The settlers' moves were supported by surveillance cameras, protected roads, guards and often by declarations of a "special security zone." To prevent infiltration, the area of the settlements was expanded and Palestinians from neighboring villages were prevented from approaching them. However, in the same breath, the moves were exploited for long-term goals, taking over and building on lands that were in large part private.

For nearly 12 years now, I have been intermittently covering the outposts, as part of my coverage of the army. Officially, the IDF doesn't see the connection between the defense establishment and the settlers. Construction in the territories is ostensibly a matter for settlement reporters and nosy activists from Peace Now. In fact, this connection is at the heart of the settlement project.

In March 1998, during a tour, I was told by the commander of the Samaria Area Brigade, in an afterthought, that although the Gidonim outposts near Itamar were established without a permit, the Defense Ministry was acting to "launder" them. On that same day, Eli Cohen, the defense minister's settlement adviser, was also touring the area. Queries put to the ministry by Knesset members were answered with evasive comments, but very quickly all the outposts in the vicinity were connected to all the necessary infrastructures.

Five years later, at the height of the Sharon prime ministership, a senior officer who had recently been demobilized after service in the territories volunteered to explain the facts of life to my colleague Guy Kotev and me. With the patience usually reserved for children who have difficulty understanding, he asked us whether we really believed that the outposts go up without the authorities' knowledge. He related that the director general of the settler organization Amana, Zeev Hever (known by his nickname, Zambish) was visiting the prime minister's residence at night to go over the maps with Sharon. "And after that you expect that we won't give them guards and we won't hook them up to the water system?" he wondered.
So it is excellent to also learn from Harel that he judges that Obama has remained adamant on the need for speedy evacuation of all the outposts.

(As a precursor to the evacuation all the settlements, I hope.)

He notes the very dire effects of the laxness that the last two US presidents have shown on the whole Israeli settlement construction question:

During the 16 years since the Oslo process began, the number of Israelis living east of the Green Line (pre-Six-Day War border) increased from 110,000 to about 300,000 (not including East Jerusalem). The number of building starts in the West Bank in 2008 was 40 percent greater than during the previous year.

2008, lest we forget, was exactly the year-long period in which George W. Bush had vowed-- during his speech at the Annapolis Middle east Peace Summit (remember that??)-- that he would broker a final-status Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before the end of his term in office.

How can anyone say that Israel's PM Ehud Olmert was negotiating "in good faith" with the Palestinians during that year, if at the same time he was accelerating his country's expropriation of, and construction upon, the Palestinian land and national heritage?

Harel ends with a sober reflection on the split, or warped, moral vision of all the people-- inside and outside the state apparatus-- who have participated in the settlement- and outpost-construction project:

Taking over the private property of someone who belongs to the neighboring people is a common phenomenon in the West Bank, even in recent years. We aren't talking here about things that happened back in 1948. It is possible, of course, to describe these moves as a necessary part of the life-and-death struggle between the two peoples, in the name of which nearly all means are justified.

One of the most obvious things learned from every visit is the extent to which things are done in a planned way, to this day. It is hard to miss the destroyed terraces in the settlement of Adam or the sight of the sewage flowing from Psagot, not far from the Binyamin regional council building, straight into the wadi that runs to the adjacent Palestinian town of El Bireh. But in those very same settlements live upstanding citizens, who would not cheat the grocer of 10 agorot and who would go out in the middle of the night to help a neighbor stuck on a dark road. In the outposts live scores of officers in the career army and the reserves, who serve in elite units and win citations for their courage. At the same time, according to the official state data, many of them have built their dream homes, a modest mobile home or a more luxurious villa, on land that has been stolen from someone else by force.
Great work, Amos Harel.